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19391 RECENT DECISIONS
ship of an instrumentality merely tends to indicate that the driver fur-
nished with the vehicle is in the owner's employ; and the borrower
will be held liable if it can be shown that the driver in the general
employment of the owner was really engaged in furthering the bor-
rower's business and that the borrower had control of the manner of
performance.1i
It .cannot be said that even the control test is an infallible one.
The elements of each case must be taken into consideration. Where,
however, it is clear that control by the defendant was coupled with
performance for the defendant and in defendant's business (as in the
instant case) the result is certain.19 The only difficulty lies in the
application of the rule to a particular set of facts.
S. M. S.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION-
MISTAKE OF LAw-MISTAKE OF FAcT.--Plaintiff, Superintendent of
Banks, seeks to recover assessments levied under Section 113a of the
N. Y. Banking Law against defendants as stockholders of the Bank
of United States. Defendants, prior to the closing of the bank, were
the owners of 326 and 10 shares of stock respectively. Shortly prior
to the closing they sold 325 and 2 shares respectively to X.1 Final
entries in the stock ledger were made after the closing of the bank.
In the first action, plaintiff sued and recovered the assessments upon
the shares remaining in defendants' names, to wit, one share and eight
shares. Relying on the case of Broderick v. Aaron, plaintiff now seeks
to recover for the shares sold by the defendants claiming that they
were not relieved of their liabilities for assessments because the trans-
fer on the stock ledger had been completed before the closing of the
bank. Held, complaint dismissed. The liability of a stockholder for
If so he becomes the borrower's servant. See note 12, supra.
= Thus, the instant case falls within the rule of Standard Oil Co. v. Ander-
son, 212 U. S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252 (1909) ("If that other furnishes him with
men to do the work and places them under his exclusive control in the per-
formance of it, those men become pro hoc vice the servants of him to whom
they are furnished.") ; cf. the dissenting opinion of Loughlin and Miller, Jj., in
Schmedes v. Defaa, 153 App. Div. 819, 138 N. Y. Supp. 931 (1st Dept. 1912);
Robbins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, 154 Misc.
788, 279 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1931). It is submitted that in the case of the inde-
pendent contractor who carries on his own work by his own means and methods,
and therefore controls the manner of the performance of the work of his
employees, it is sufficient to show that the employee was engaged in his business
or in business contemplated or incidental to the contract Higgins v. West.
Union Tel. Co., 156 N. Y. 75, 50 N. E. 500 (1898); Chapin-Owen Co. v.
Yeoman, 232 App. Div. 560, 250 N. Y. Supp. 95 (4th Dept. 1931).
'The statement of facts erroneously states the number of eight shares sold
by this defendant.
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assessments is a single cause of action which cannot be split; the prior
judgments against the defendants being a bar to the instant action.
White v. Adler, 255 App. Div. 580, - N. Y.. S. (2d) - (1st Dept.
1938).
The nature of a stockholder's liability for assessments has been
variously described.2 In New York the rule is that the liability of a
stockholder in a banking corporation is contractual in its nature. By
acquiring stocks the stockholder enters into an implied contract on
his part that he will be liable for the indebtedness of the bank in the
manner and to the extent prescribed by the statute.8
Prior to the decision in Broderick v. Aaron 4 it was held in New
York that the owner of record of stock in a banking corporation is
relieved from his liability for assessments when he has sold his stock
and has done all that is necessary to cause the certificates to be trans-
ferred on the books of the bank.5 In Broderick v. Aaron the Court
of Appeals laid down the rule that a stockholder is not relieved from
his liability upon a transfer of his stock when, before a reasonable
time has lapsed after his request for a transfer on the books, the bank
has closed.6
The assessment on shares in a banking corporation creates a
personal obligation of the stockholder which is one and entire, the
amount of shares owned by the individual stockholder being the mea-
sure only to fix the extent of his liability.7  Upon a single cause of
action one action only can be maintained. A single cause of action
or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be
made the subject of different actions. The recovery of one judgment
bars the whole claim. The law abhors multiplicity of actions and aims
to prevent vexatious and oppressive litigation.8
'Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N. Y. 430, 105 N. E. 680 (1914);
13 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. (Perm. ed. 1939) § 6270, nn. 10, 13.
'White v. Idsardi, 253 App. Div. 96, 102, 300 N. Y. Supp. 1239 (4th Dept.
1937).
1268 N. Y. 411, 414, 198 N. E. 11 (1935).
'Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Misc. 353, 265 N. Y. Supp. 804 (1933), aff'd,
243 App. Div. 692 (1st Dept. 1935), the court, at p. 358, citing Richards v.
Robin, 178 App. Div. 535, 543, 165 N. Y. Supp. 780 (1st Dept. 1917), and
Whitney v. Butler, 118 U. S. 655, 7 Sup. Ct. 61 (1885).
6 The court tries to distinguish this case from Broderick v. Adamson. The
facts in both cases, however, are the same.
" Harrison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385, 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905),
cert. denied, 199 U. S. 607, 26 Sup. Ct. 749 (1905). The nature of assessments
upon stocks is unlike assessments for local improvements where a lien on the
property only is created so that an action as to each lot is a separate cause of
action even where the several lots are owned by the same person. Real Con-
struction and Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. 543, 132 Pac. 1048
(1913).
'Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N. Y. 345, 347 (1881); Carvill v. Mirror Films,
Inc., 178 App. Div. 644, 165 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1917); 1 C. J. S. 1308 (1936)
§ 102. In other countries, actions for a part of a claim are favored by the
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An exception to this rule exists where, without his own fault or
negligence, the plaintiff, at the time of bringing his first action, was
ignorant of the facts constituting his cause of action, e.g., of the true
amount of the claim or the full extent of the wrongs received or in-
juries done.9 In the present case, when he brought his first action
plaintiff knew all the facts constituting his claim but was mistaken as
to the point of law. Relying upon Broderick v. Adamson,'0 the doc-
trine of which is still the rule in the federal courts," he sued only
for the shares not sold by defendants. Citing Harrison v. Remington
Paper Co.12 that a mistake of law will not relieve a party from the
application of the rule against splitting a cause of action, the court
holds that plaintiff is prevented from bringing the present action be-
cause he failed to sue for these assessments in the first action.
Now, we are confronted with the following situation: Had plain-
tiff in his first action sued for assessments upon all the shares owned
by defendants, sold as well as not sold, his action would presumably
have been defeated under the doctrine of Broderick v. Adamson, and
such judgment would have been a bar to any subsequent action
law in order to enable a plaintiff to test a claim for a considerable amount by
bringing an action for a part only, so saving fees and cost which are computed
upon the amount actually sued for. Such action for a part, however, does not
bar the running of the Statute of Limitations as against the balance of the
claim.
.1 C. J. S. 1313 (1936) § 102. In Gedney v. Gedney, 160 N. Y. 471,
55 N. E. 1 (1899), the court said: "Even if it were possible to apply the rule
against the-splitting up of accounts or demands, the facts show here that at
the time he filed the claim plaintiff did not know that defendant had collected
the rents now in question. Of necessity, the splitting up of accounts or demands
implies on the part of the suitor a conscious act or knowledge."
"See note 5, supra.
'Young v. FloriaL 81 F. (2d) 275, 277 (App. D. C. 1935); Whitney v.
Butler, 118 U. S. 655, 7 Sup. Ct. 61 (1886); Earle v. Carson, 188 U. S. 42,
23 Sup. Ct. 254 (1903); Apsey v. Kimball, 221 U. S. 514, 31 Sup. Ct. 695(19111.
"See note 7, supra. This case represents the federal rule; see International
Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 56 F. (2d) 708, 710 (1932), the
Court of Claims .saying: "The courts have in some instances granted relief to a
plaintiff where the suit first brought was instituted under a mistaken belief as
to facts; but the mistake in this case, if there was any, related to the law, and
for such a mistake the courts can afford no relief."; Guettel v. United States,
95 F. (2d) 229, 232 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), listing New York upon Gedney v.
Gedney, supra note 9, among the jurisdictions where lack of knowledge of the
parties as to their legal rights has been recognized as an exception to the rule
that a prior judgment upon the merits is a bar to a second action upon the
same claim. But already in HahI v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901),
where a plaintiff had two remedies, an action for ejectment and an action in
equity, the court held that since there was only one cause of action the judg-
ment in the ejectment suit barred a subsequent action in equity because the
equitable relief prayed for, under proper pleadings, could have been granted in
the first action.
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against defendants, although in the meantime the law has changed,
because an adjudication erroneous however it may be is res judicata.13
P.S.
REAL- PROPERTY-SECTION 78 OF THE MULTIPLE DWELLING
LAW - CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN LANDLORD AND
TENANT.-Defendant corporation leased premises from the plaintiff
in order to sub-let the same, under a lease which contained the fol-
lowing covenants: (1) landlord reserved the right to re-enter to make
such repairs as he might deem necessary; (2) the tenant was to make
such repairs of the premises as were due to its neglect or misuse;
(3) there should be no allowance to tenant for a diminution of rental
value and no liability upon landlord for failure to make any repairs.
The tenant repaired the premises which had deteriorated without his
fault after the landlord had refused so to do. The tenant then ten-
dered his bill of costs together with the balance of the rent after de-
ducting said costs which the landlord refused to accept. In the land-
lord's action for summary proceedings the tenant counterclaimed for
the value of the repairs to be set off as against the rent, claiming that
Section 78 of the N. Y. Multiple ,Dwelling Law 1 had imposed a duty
upon the landlord to repair. The trial court dismissed the counter-
claim and gave judgment to the plaintiff. On appeal, held, affirmed.
Although Section 78 has extended the landlord's tort liability, it does
not alter the contract obligations of the parties. Their rights must
be determined by the covenants in the lease and in the absence of the
landlord's express covenant to repair the tenant cannot successfully
set off the cost of repairs. Emigrant Industrial Bank v. One Hundred
Eight West Forty Ninth Street Corp., 255 App. Div. 570, 8 N. Y. S.
(2d) 354 (lst Dept. 1938).
A covenant to repair will never be implied. 2 An oral contract
12 FREEMAN, JUDGMXTS (5th ed. 1925) 1436, § 709 ("But where the
parties and the matter to be determined are identical, the former adjudication
is res judicata and conclusive of the law as applied to that matter, even though
it is afterwards determined that the law was erroneously adjudicated or ap-
plied."). "The effect of the judgment is not at all dependent upon the correct-
ness of the verdict or finding upon which it was rendered." Wilson's Executor
v. Deen, 121 U. S. 525, 534, 7 Sup. Ct. 1004 (1887).
1 "Every multiple dwelling and every part thereof shall be kept in good
repair * * *. The owner of such multiple dwelling shall be responsible for
compliance with the provisions of this section but the tenant also shall be liable
for every violation of the provisions of this section if such violation is caused
by his own wilful act or negligence or that of any member of his household
or his guest."
' Witty v. Matthews, 52 N. Y. 512 (1873); Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y. 306,
30 N. E. 837 (1892).
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